Jim Rutherford Penguins bad contracts and trades: the deals that still haunt Pittsburgh

Jim Rutherford’s first tour as Pittsburgh Penguins general manager produced a Stanley Cup in 2016 and 2017, but the hangover was brutal. Between 2018 and 2020 the Hall-of-Fame executive signed or acquired a string of contracts that quickly became anchors on the salary cap. When Rutherford suddenly resigned in January 2021, he left behind a roster littered with untradeable money and a prospect cupboard picked clean to keep the dynasty alive. The fallout still shapes every move new GM Ron Hextall can make today.

The summer of 2018: when Jim Rutherford Penguins bad contracts and trades began piling up

Free agency opened on July 1, 2018, and Rutherford struck fast. Jack Johnson got a five-year, $16.25 million pact after the Columbus Blue Jackets bought him out. The same day, 31-year-old bottom-six winger Matt Cullen returned for a third Pittsburgh stint at $3.25 million total. Less than two weeks later the GM gave 29-year-old fourth-liner Derek Grant a raise to $650 K, then flipped him to Anaheim anyway. The common thread: term and no-trade protection for players whose underlying numbers were already slipping.

The Johnson deal drew the loudest groans. Analytics models projected the 31-year-old defenceman as a replacement-level player, yet the contract included a full no-move clause for the first three seasons. Within a year Johnson’s ice time dropped below 16 min a night and his $3.25 M cap hit became immovable. The Penguins ultimately paid Seattle a 2022 second-round pick in the expansion draft to take the final two years off the books—one of the steepest “bribes” in NHL history.

Trading futures for Erik Gudbranson doubled down on the mistake

Eleven months after the Johnson contract, Rutherford decided Pittsburgh needed more “heavy” defencemen. On February 25, 2019, he sent struggling centre Derick Brassard plus a 2019 fourth-round pick and prospect second-rounder to Vancouver for Erik Gudbranson. The towering blueliner arrived with two years left at $4 M per season and a résumé of poor shot-share numbers. The trade cost the Penguins two draft picks and failed to address the real issue: speed on the back end.

Gudbranson’s lone full season in Pittsburgh produced 6 points in 69 games and a 46.1 Corsi %. Rather than admit the error, Rutherford doubled down again, extending the 28-year-old for four years and $16 M in February 2020. The contract was immediately lampooned; The Athletic’s model called it “the worst extension of the deadline.” New management unloaded Gudbranson to Ottawa six months later, but only after retaining 33 % of his salary—meaning Pittsburgh will pay him through 2023-24 to play elsewhere.

The 2020 offseason: Jim Rutherford Penguins bad contracts and trades reach their peak

Coming off a qualifying-round upset to Montreal, Rutherford promised “tweaks, not a rebuild.” His October 2020 looked more like a demolition. First he traded a conditional 2021 third-round pick to San Jose for 40-point winger Patrick Marleau, then signed the 41-year-old to a one-year, $700 K deal that carried almost zero upside. Days later the GM swapped useful middle-six forward Nick Bjugstad’s expiring $4.1 M hit to Minnesota, but took back 50 % retention and the final year of Greg Pateryn’s $2.25 M contract—another depth defenceman with injury issues.

The kicker came on October 27, 2020, when Rutherford gave 33-year-old centre Mark Jankowski a one-way, $700 K contract after a 5-goal season in Calgary. Jankowski made the roster, produced 1 goal in 45 games, and was lost on waivers the following March. Each move chipped away at Pittsburgh’s flexibility; by opening night 2021 the club had less than $200 K in deadline cap space, hamstringing replacement GM Patrik Allvin when injuries struck.

How the contracts still handcuff the 2025 Penguins

Dead money travels. Because of retained salary and buyouts, Pittsburgh’s 2025-26 cap sheet still carries:

• $1.33 M for Gudbranson (retained)
• $1.17 M for Jack Johnson (buyout)
• $562 K for Nick Bjugstad (retained)

That $3 M in ghost charges equals the price of a quality third-liner, precisely the depth the aging core of Sidney Crosby, Evgeni Malkin and Kris Letang now needs. The Penguins have missed the playoffs in two of the last three seasons, and Hextall has been forced to push prospects into roles they aren’t ready for because he lacks the cap room to shop in the mid-tier free-agent market. Even with the ceiling rising, every dollar counts for a team whose window is closing fast.

What the analytics said then—and say now

Public models warned against almost every deal at the time. Dom Luszczyszyn’s Game Score Value projection saw Johnson as worth roughly league minimum, yet the Penguins guaranteed him 62 % more. Gudbranson’s expected wins above replacement was negative when the extension was signed, and Evolving-Hockey’s contract tool gave the pact a 2 % probability of positive value. In hindsight, the algorithms were kind; the actual on-ice impact was worse. From 2018-2021, Penguins shot-share with Johnson on the ice at 5-on-5 was 47.3 %; with Gudbranson it was 44.8 %. Both marks ranked last among Pittsburgh defencemen over the span.

Could any of the Jim Rutherford Penguins bad contracts and trades have worked?

Hockey is probabilistic, not deterministic, so every gamble has an upside case. Johnson’s scouting report praised his playoff experience and penalty-killing reps; Gudbranson’s 2019-20 stretch with the Penguins (52 % Corsi after the trade) hinted at competence when paired with mobile partners. The problem was the structure: too much term, too much no-trade leverage, and too many overlapping skill sets. When the bet soured, the Penguins couldn’t cut losses quickly because the contracts were designed to avoid exactly that.

Lessons for the next front office

Ron Hextall and Brian Burke have already changed Pittsburgh’s risk profile. Extensions for Bryan Rust and Rickard Rakell came with trade-friendly signing bonuses rather than no-move clauses. The 2023 Jake Guentzel trade brought three prospects and a first-round pick—assets Rutherford routinely dealt for short-term help. Internally, the club now uses a hybrid analytics panel before every signing, and ownership has green-lit smaller, one-year bets on rebound players like Lars Eller instead of multi-year albatrosses.

Still, the shadow remains. As long as retained money and buyouts clog the books, the Penguins operate with one hand tied. Contending again will require precision drafting—something the organization has struggled with since 2015—and perhaps a difficult conversation about the length of the Crosby-era core. Fans hoping for another splashy deadline acquisition should remember the cost of the last era’s “win-now” mentality every time the team’s social media teases a big move.

The Rutherford years delivered two banners that hang forever in PPG Paints Arena. They also produced a ledger of dead cap space that will follow the franchise into the second half of the decade. Championships are priceless, but the bill eventually comes due—and Pittsburgh is still paying interest on the Jim Rutherford Penguins bad contracts and trades that closed the first window.